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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
Respondent Erred As a Matter of Law In Finding That
Petitioner's Home Was Not An Exempt Asset Under the
Medicaid Statute
Respondent contends that petitioner has attempted to sell
the six and one-half acres across the road, and so It is an
available asset.

That argument is not dispositive.

Petitioner's intentions do not govern in determining whether
there are in fact two separate lots.

Admittedly, once the

property is sold it would be considered legally divided.
However, until such a legal interest haa been created in another
party, the property remains a single, undivided entity.
Respondent also contends that petitioner's evidence which
shows that the lot is not subdivided, the city plat introduced
at the hearing, is not dispositive.

(R. 46). Nevertheless,

respondent admits that the road is not entered on the plat and
that a recent tax notice contains no reference to an easement or
right-of-way over the lot. (Respondent's Brief p. 9 ) .
Respondent suggests, however, that these facts do not refute
that the six and one-half acres have been valued at $15,000.00,
and are thus an available asset for eligibility determination.
This argument misses the point.

1

First, despite respondent's contention, the record does not
show that the property is worth $15,000,00.

All the record

indicates is that this was the amount that was asked by
petitioner Tibbetts.

(R. 37). The property does not

necessarily have that much value, however, as it has never been
formally appraised.

Moreover, the fact that the property has

not sold at this price would suggest that it is not worth
$15,000.00.
Second, and more important, whether the six and one-half
acres are worth $15,000.00 or not, the city plat evidence shows
that the property—all 8.14 acres—is a single lot.

Despite the

monetary value of some of petitioner's acres, the crucial
question is whether those acres constitute a single whole. No
legal Interest has been created which subdivides petitioner's
interest in the entire lot. (R. 70). Thus, petitioner owns all
of the land over which the path crosses and his evidence of
ownership outweighs any supposed division created by the
caseworker.
The introduction of the plat also shows that petitioner's
8.14 acre lot does not exceed the average size lot for the
community of Genola, Utah. (R. 46). A visual comparison of
petitioner's lot with those of others in the plat shows that it
is smaller than the majority of the properties contained therein.
2

Respondent is correct in concluding that petitioner's
argument presupposes the path does not divide the property.
(Respondent's brief p. 10). This is because of the strength of
petitioner's evidence.

It Is equally true that respondent's

argument presupposes that the road does divide the property into
separate parcels.

However, in light of the evidence on record,

and the absence of contrary evidence, the city plat shows that
the property in controversy is legally one lot. Thus, because
the six and one-half acres are part of the lot upon which
petitioner's home resides, under APA Volume III

411.1,

petitioner's home and lot, all eight acres, should be exempt
from the Medicaid eligiblity determination.

Clearly, the record

contains ample evidence showing that th$ caseworker failed to
reasonably interpret the regulations and thus respondent
Dandoy's decision was erroneous.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner has established that he was eligible for
Medicaid during December, 1985, because the home he was living
in was exempt.

The lot on which the home was situated was also

exempt, since it did not exceed an average size lot for the
community where he lived.

Respondent hfts failed to establish

that petitioner owned a separate parcel of land.

Therefore,

respondent's disqualification of petitioner was an unreasonable
3

application of the federal statute and regulations.

Petitioner

requests that the Court reverse the decision of the district
court and enter its order requiring respondent to award him
medicaid benefits for the months of December, 1985.
DATED this

J3

day of

QjJ^&SJJlA

, 1988.
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